Showing posts with label society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label society. Show all posts

Saturday, June 11, 2022

A Networked Peace

"To live effectively is to live with adequate information."
 
Norbert Weiner had maintained that nature has an inherent tendency to degrade the organized. The organism, according to him, is opposed to death and disintegration "as message is to noise" - postulating a perpetual conflict between the self-organising and the organised. This is evident everywhere. Take, for example, the rules based world order. The thing about complex adaptive systems is that given their tendencies towards self-organisation, they generally find a way to work around any and all rules. The former then has to reassert itself to turn the self-organising into the organised, as long as it can. Thus the first secretary general of NATO had defined peace as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down - and the secretary general of NATO today would continue to insist upon the same peace. But undoubtedly in an arena staged upon competing networks, one man's peace is bound to become another's war and vice versa.    
 
Notwithstanding, how do we ensure that in this struggle between the self-organising and the organised, a structure evolves and not destructs. Mr. Weiner had suggested that since all organisations are held together by communication, effective communication engineering is the key to steering society in a purposeful direction. Communication effects control. That is indeed the most fundamental insight of cybernetics, whose father understood society only through the study of the messages and communication facilities which belong to it. Thus the way to create a social structure is to restrict and regulate the information flows in that society, to destroy that structure is to destroy or divert those information flows, i.e. create new information flows. That is what the internet did too.
 
Enter digital networks and artificial agents. The internet hasn't lived upto the expectations of the founders of computing. JCR Licklider, for example, had prophesied that in the information age, unemployment would disappear from the face of the earth because of the opportunities offered by "an infinite crescendo of on-line interactive debugging". Seems unlikely to happen. A lot of the computing giants couldn't foresee the future that their dream machine, AI, would bring aboard while the humanity, globally and gently, sleepwalks into an era of perpetual warring and a painful transformation of the nation-state.
 
In 2011, a startup named Pacific Social Architecting Corporation, figured if they could change these information flows using online socialbots, they'd be able to alter the social architecture of a community. They tried and while their experiments met with some success, their startup did not. Almost two decades later, researchers writing for Nature Communications describe the use of similar software agents to produce "information gerrymandering" - forcing an asymmetric assortment of influence over an unsuspecting population and creating the majority illusion for specific nodes. Even in their highly-cited paper on social botnets, Yazan Boshmaf and others had suggested early on that each social bot in an online social network is going to be capable of two kinds of influence operations - those related to social interaction, and those related to the social structure. And we are only now witnessing the true meaning of that. To think about it, using networks of bots to create a very elaborate deception, even military deception, looks fairly doable with present developments in natural language and image processing. Unsurprisingly, some researchers did gone ahead and demonstrated the use of a guided social botnet to infiltrate and cultivate specific employees of targeted organisations(!).
 
Since communication effects control, the problem of Command and Control (C2) of operating such social machines becomes a problem of architecting a resilient and credible flow of information to effect specific organisational behaviours. The older methods of botnet command and control are no longer even suitable in this environment, as the use of social networks inevitable brings in a P2P architecture (i.e. each software agent can send encrypted commands to the rest of the network). We are thus seeing some very interesting C2 designs when it comes to bot deployments - from the use of smart contracts and blockchain to implement the C2 to embedding bot commands into Bitcoin transactions, we seem to be headed for interesting times in the cyberspace. To anyone still skeptical, do checkout this report on an IoT botnet that not just hacks your networked devices but also creates and operates socialbots using that infrastructure, even including a Machine Learning component that can be turned on or off depending upon the human users' responses on social media platforms.
 
Other than coordinating the bot network, identifying and prioritising the human users to reach using bots is also another challenge. These days, digital social networks enable a large number of unintended users to join an unfolding event i.e. the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. To those having to watch random networks form and dissolve from the existing scale free asymmetric networks of our modern human existence, following things must be highlighted about the human network to manipulate this "network-centric" environment:  
     -Which nodes have the decision rights?
     -What nodal decision rights can be accessed using software agents?
     -What is the pattern of interaction between these and other nodes?
     -What kind of inflow-outflow of information emerges from these networks? 

Coming back to the 1992 social architecting experiment, a key question that arises is whether such strategic use of software agent networks can overturn the importance of the existing key nodes in the human digital networks today? The key nodes are the information junctions, a kind of intelligence device within the network. Being at the junction, these nodes have power to regulate information flows, directly affecting a lot of other nodes, which also gives these a disproportionate amount of power over the rest of the network. It must be noted here how the information domain comes into a very intimate embrace with the cognitive and the political domains.

The original software robot was designed to provide an integrated and expressive interface to the internet as well as to change its behavior and choice of actions in response to transient system conditions. A coordinating network of such programs acting socially brings to table an important non-human agency in human affairs. Since computers today "record, relay, represent and inform our responses" to almost all political-military-economic conflicts as they unfold - today's digital networks potentially enable much coercive and destructive potential in the hands of robots. Our digital societies, as well as the their dominant military-industrial-media networks, both face the everyday dangers of interconnectivity i.e. networked terrorism, recurrent misinformation cascades, and computer/biological viruses to name a few. As Buddha used to say, everything is interconnected and life is suffering. In retrospect, it is a tribute to Turing that “bot or not” is turning into one of the defining questions of our hyper-connected age as the animal and the machine networks slowly renegotiate the structure of a new peace.

P.S. Credits to Scott Wolcott for the inspiration.
 

Sunday, January 3, 2021

Cautious Quadrilateralities


There was the sound like a rumor without any echo of history, really beginning.

Following the recent Chinese overtures towards Arunachal, Ladakh, and Sikkim - notably sending troops, altering maps, taking land and calling for peace - there now hopefully would have enkindled some degree of sovereign urgency among Delhi's international security leaders towards a reassessment of some of our geostrategic priorities. So understandably (with some hindsight) while we might want to avoid symmetrical competition with an obviously bigger opponent and focus on emerging capabilities which could break an established stalemate and provide sustainable asymmetric advantages to constrain CCP actions in future. Delhi and even Dharamshala both understand this very well, after all. And other than the slowly simmering borders and periodic geo-economic swings, India also has a bit of a civilizational obligation to herself that Asia doesn't turn into a CCP fiefdom.

Under this kind of environment, there has lately been a resurgence and expansion of the old US-JP-AU-IN HADR (The Quad) alliance which in itself is a center of varied interests owing to its strong political proximity with maritime dominance and the welfares originating from a post-pandemic diversification of China based supply chains. There have even been some efforts to promulgate the idea that this arrangement is not against China. In all honesty, unless China itself joins the mix, any attempts to regulate the security of Indo-Pacific waters will have to take on a character which faces China as the opponent. This is a bit of a Tolstoyan case of the fate of nations being independent from the individual wills of their kings and ministers.

That said, there are valid reasons to reconsider the strategic utility of institutionalizing these emerging structures. Japan is a treaty-based US ally. Australia is a US ally which with RCEP is unlikely to break from an economic dependence on China. The US of course, is the incumbent politico-military arbiter of liberal world order. None of these shares a land boundary with or has massive trigger-happy territorial disputes with China. We do. But the quadrilateral isn't about India, it is about "Indo-Pacific". And that thick line needs more policy thickening, because given West's ideological and economic competition with China, it can be easy to surmise that the IOR or the Indo aspects of Indo-Pacific will recieve less attention than the Pacific aspects. Besides, a third of the worldwide maritime trade passes through the South China Sea that is being contested over, and the Chinese aren't exactly going to accept some fancy rules based order in strictly diplomatic manners.

It can also be expected that more and more states joining this arrangement will still try to maximize their relational benefits while minimizing the individual costs even if that isn't in the grander strategic interests of the arrangement itself. It is well known that specific goal oriented coalitions with clear objectives are better than a general-purpose bloc riding-the-waves of international waters. The military incentives here rest with the former, or in very localized regional arrangements between states trying to order their own backyards. Unless there are strong political and economic incentives, no one is going to make commitments of manpower and resources for expeditionary operations to defend foreign interests. So it can be fairly argued in this case that expansion for sake of expansion, while gaining more legitimacy in the eyes of public and possibly even some international institutions, would tend to dilute the coalitionary maritime defense potential unless carefully guarded against.

China too is aware of the possible maritime encircling and will focus on global economy to find its way out. Consequently it has revamped its foreign investment regime and launched a slew of techno-economic armamentarium including the central bank's digital currency which could in future help in renminbi internationalization, generating non-trade currency demands, and in getting the CCP a hold over China's burgeoning money networks and perhaps over the slippery oil shores as well. Considering 'all the things that need consideration' maybe the best way to think about the current stratagems is to affirmatively rephrase Derek Walcott that the sea is indeed the history.


Saturday, September 5, 2020

Fail Securely

As systems become more complex, they are also likely to fail in ways of which the exact mechanism might be harder to predict and understand beforehand. With machine-learning systems, there is a bigger problem than failure, which is exhibiting a potentially dangerous behavior as and when failure occurs, as part of the system/sub-system failure. This concern is understandably further magnified in the context of lethal autonomous systems. 

Exploitation surface of a generic ML pipeline

Given the increasingly diverse exploitation routes, the prevailing ideas suggest to have a well trained human operator who is periodically assessing whether an AI is misinterpreting its environment. But conventional human-in-the-loop mechanisms are ill-suited to handle spatiotemporal complexity. Consider for example a large number of potential targets in a tough or no geography and an extremely compressed timeline for making engagement. In this situation it is simply not feasible for the AI to refer back to the human operator every time an engagement has to be made.

If adapted suitably, the old concept of kill-boxes may produce a simple socio-technical solution to the problem of how to detach from conventional human-in-the-loop and embrace independent decision-making in military AIs while still keeping the operator to monitor incoming data. It is also in line with the existing cyber-security principles of network segmentation and granting access based on user's role/location/time etc.

By not wholly depending upon autonomous systems' ability to interpret context and limiting its "full-fledged use" within a human generated spatiotemporal compartment i.e. a kill-box, we would not only impart the AI operation a human-like non-zero probability of making high risk "alpha zero" moves, but also allow more secure failures that cannot exacerbate the larger conflict while providing all the benefits of deploying advanced autonomous technology. This is especially valid for the global-common type environments like the space and the ocean, and of course the internet too; where there is further need to research and manage AI security risks as most nations in such environments are virtually in a persistent struggle with their allies and adversaries simultaneously. 

A typical conventional kill-box. (image source: WikiLeaks)

Ideally, a military should develop its own autonomous systems instead of relying on commercial off-the-shelf products or even allies' systems for those may come with their own inductive biases and are sometimes less likely to fully support complex missions. There are obvious economic, organizational and foreign policy incentives for doing this. And most importantly it would let the machine behavior policy and AI failures be much more clearly defined and adversarially trained against in a manner that does away with insecure failures while also suiting the respective country's cultural sensibilities.

Speaking of latter, complex societies require a fair amount of organized coercion, socioeconomic incentives, cultural deterrence and mutation over a course of centuries to become eligible for the "civilization badge". So it should be natural to want your AIs to reflect those civilizational ethos. Understandably culture isn't an engineer's problem but the way technology (particularly ICT) accords vastly different modes of social interactions and restructures social and even political affairs, it sets the premise for engineering which can function as 'politics by other means'. Perhaps Kaczynski was right. And that's all the more reason to develop systems that embrace failures, and fail securely.

Monday, July 22, 2019

Sadbuddhi in Sets

"We tend to forget that throughout history many decision-makers were delighted to accept “double or nothing” tactics if the odds looked sufficiently favorable." Kahn

Too constrained to maximize?
Alexander Kotov, the Chess grandmaster with eyebrows worth a queen sacrifice and probably also a KGB fellow, was quite on the mark while describing a disposition to make judgmental errors and go with a misplaced gut while being constrained with overanalysed choices. The agency of 'constrained maximizers', not necessarily always as rational as in the western conception, has its students in the arena of conflicts beyond the chess board, rooted in its potential for both serendipity as well as misfortune. A Machiavellian adage therefore rightly suggests that true prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles and in the choice to take the lesser evil. In Yogic philosophy there is a word for that, Sadbuddhi, referring to developing the much touted virtue of timely knowing the right thing to do - arguably resolving the groupthink/polythink syndromes that beset most decision making units. This writing is inclined to touch upon political culture and the decision making therein, so we'll follow the lens of intra-species aggression. And although coalationary intra-species aggression spans our non-relatives too, from lions and wolves to even numerous ant species among others, we'll stick to apes likes us.

The term "political culture" itself is recent, though the practices have existed throughout. Like humans, chimpanzees too have a coalationary psychology — that is an inclination to form closely structured groups/ecosystems with strategic hostility toward outgroups, and sometimes even outliers. Other than cooperation, reciprocity and role division - the division of meat and other resources among chimps follows a process of sharing in which power, sex, and violence tend to interact in rather human ways. So different groups of chimps in their territories end up having very different behaviours and social customs, developing different kind of tools and manifesting different communication mechanisms thusly. Reductionism it is, but a chimp order rises with its own crude geopolitics.

The human society too, going by Dunbar's logic, functions in sets of humans. The successful sets have and attract more members (Roman allies rebelled in 80s BC not for secession but for overt Roman citizenship), while losing few to others. This is compounded by the networked nature of an information society. Yet these sets and their members, like those of chimps, never function outside the laws of direct or indirect reciprocity towards each other i.e. I'll help you but when we meet again then you help me. This basic evolutionary dynamics makes Proportionality perhaps the only natural law of war, and other conflicts between sets.

Basis 'Proportionality', the nuclear MAD doctrines would appear as optimized bluffing, for all WMD may be CBRN weapons but not all CBRN weapons are WMD, but that discussion is for another day. As it is, all such interpretations, by nature of self-interest, are biased and susceptible to 'syndromes of the self' i.e. self-deception and self-centeredness. Coming back, it is safe to say that the set-membership nature of society causes, especially in the conditions of present degree of connectedness, an evolving instance of political boundary setting, from physical boundary to the ideological ones shaping member identities.

Basic Structural Coupling
It is well known, that for a system to stay "alive" it must preserve its identity. Though since the gap between perception and reality is also a socio-psychological threat surface, the system must keep maneuvering the environment around it and be fluid enough to evolve along. In the age when goal setting of AIs is termed not an engineering but a political problem, the notions of 'structural coupling' between systems and environment therefore apply equally to political cultures as well. An advice from John Boyd "the maneuverist" suggests decision makers to approach people, ideas, and machines — in that order. However the how-to of such abstractions remains subject to systemic pressures and some degrees of operational and organisational elusiveness, often threatening a conceptually devolving set.

Pursuing a Systemic Sadbuddhi thus becomes a matter of acting on and perceiving reality without letting our beliefs be colored by our desires (and fears), and as Robert Jervis has recommended, making our 'Assumptions, Beliefs, and Predictions' explicit and inquisitory, for it underlines that the predictions are always resting on some assumptions. Taking human society as a whole, the present chimp world order reflects the inertia of the predominant last great war positions. As the economic center-of-gravity shifts from Atlantic to the Pacific and technology gives chimps men equalizing effects over adversaries, how the decision makers of resource constrained competing sets battle it out remains to be seen. One thing is evident though that usually he who would pay the piper, historically speaking, will call the tune.
__

Saturday, September 29, 2018

On Rewards

"Any rational society would either kill me or give me my books." 
-Hannibal

Society only tolerates a certain kind of deviance, the kind that has a great or novel expectation of rewards. AI engineers too reflect these tendencies when treating that certain kind of deviance in agents as a refreshing intelligent behavior, given that it is rewarding to the larger interests. A rudimentary example of this could be a bipedal robot figuring out the use of his hands when the walk involves a steep climb by imitating what it observes in other agents, biological and otherwise. As it is, in swarm the most critical information is always coming from the nearest agents which are also considered to be the most reliable. In humans at least, learning does not always lead to a permanent change of behavior, expectation of rewards and fear of punishments often puts us onto the path of overlooking or even misinterpreting our learnings. Yet while the discovery of which response leads to what effect goes far beyond just observations, observational learning is said to be the most prominent method of learning. It should be evident therefore that the attention control mechanism and a hyper-sensitive selection of stimulus and response can make the difference between a satisfactory outcome and the optimal one.

Unlike naturally occuring intelligence, Artificial Intelligence gets its teeth mostly from nurture, as 'nature' mostly applies to its embodiment and hardware limitations. The case of human multitasking is an interesting study in the nurturing of intelligent behavior. A productive use of downtime fetches a much higher reward value than leisure and inertia. We have effective attention mechanisms to cope with long & complex inputs, we apply controlled attention and carry out continuous switching between tasks to maximize rewards. Our perceptual motor expertise gets better with the task familiarity and an economic attentional distribution is then either always rewarded or is at least never punished. More than that, we consistently acquire new goals and build a hierarchy of goals (correlating with hierarchy of needs) which helps us to multitask better and organize our time and life towards greater reward expectancy.

Now if we are to have agents with the ability to acquire new goals on their own, operating under a predetermined hierarchy of goals based on a cause-effect relationship, AI will need a more purposeful nature of being which risks an even willful acceptance of punishments (or negative rewards) towards the greater goal. A finer sentiment sensitivity, a clear demarcation between mission-specific-sensing and non-mission-specific-sensing, and a causality based actuation that draws from dynamic sets of rules seems to be the way forward.

Any finite set of rules, as frames and boxes generally go, is bound to provide an incomplete approximation of reality. As some philosophers have noted, instinct is the most intelligent among all forms of intelligence, and it is least bound by the concerns and deliberations of rewards and punishments as compared to the non-instinctive actions. With more and more seamless and direct coupling of perception to action and an incomplete knowledge-base like humans, sometimes agents too, like humans, can run into a quagmire best described by a remark which Napoleon had made after losing the war in Russia, that, between the sublime to the ridiculous is one short step. Bonne Guerre.

---