Showing posts with label networks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label networks. Show all posts

Monday, September 21, 2026

The Biopolitics of Intelligence

Here I frame a macro-level biopolitics of AI by arguing that a) not all machine intelligence is artificial, b) the nature of access over topline machine intelligence will shape or constrain critical societal intelligence functions, c) the ability to blockade intelligence, enhance or degrade the quality of its delivery, represents a major threat to societies and organisations, and d) the only reliable and long-term solution to the problem of intelligence blockade is sovereign local deployment.

  
a) Not all machine intelligence is artificial.

I go back to Herbert Simon here - artificial are those designs which embody a human purpose. The garden is artificial, the woods are natural. Most machine intelligence we encounter does embody a human purpose. However, it is not necessary, theoretically, that the goals an AI pursues draw upon human purposes. There is more to this. Consider a single biological neuron. It is a simple electrochemical switch. It either fires, or does not, based on its immediate synaptic inputs. It does not "know" what language is, what memory feels like, or how to solve a math problem, but trillions of these dumb switches self-organize to exhibit the human consciousness.

The key here is very complex systems which emerge due to simple agents interacting using very simple rules. A single node in a deep artificial neural network performs simple linear combination following an activation function and holds no intrinsic knowledge. Yet, when billions of these nodes iteratively adjust their connections and weights, high-level abstraction spontaneously emerges. We don't know how (that is where the challenge of explainability comes), it just does and more so as you keep scaling. If you can have a functionally smarter, functionally creative system, arguing over whether it has "thought" or "simulation" is pedantic - you've got bigger problems. 

This self-organised coherence is why it is possible that an AI may not always embody human purposes, despite working on a substrate that was built by humans. This means that machine intelligence may instead become increasingly shaped (like human intelligence) by the adaptive requirements of the socio-technical networks within which they are embedded. This throws your align-in-the-lab-deploy-in-the-wild out of the window. The real alignment will happen in the woods, not in the garden.     


b) Available machine intelligence will shape societal intelligence   

An acquaintance of mine recently began exploring AI models for live financial/stock analysis. His complaint is that the same model has become stupid now (earlier it was smarter). His problem is that he never had the model, he only has whatever artificial intelligence trickled down to him through free, or nominally paid, APIs. It shapes his own performance in relation to those who could have access to better models. Trading is a zero-sum game, so he loses to those who have better infra and better AI. Now extrapolate his experience to organisations, governments, populations, vulnerable sections of society. Differential AI capacity will lead to some humans, probably clustered in specific geographies, absolutely dominating over the rest simply by being able to know, predict, and do more, better, and faster than others.  

It is highly unlikely that the Big AI labs will ever release the absolute best of their models to the public, it is more likely that those will be monetised on a B2B/B2G basis and the consumer grade models will offer a degraded performance over their limited access counterparts. All this is just economics and has nothing to do with AI risks or any other pontifications about saving humanity. The only hope is open-source catching up and converging with some more technical breakthroughs. 

c) The coming of intelligence blockades 

The claim that biology self-organizes intrinsically while AI is organized extrinsically (by human "loss functions") is drawing an arbitrary line where the system ends and the environment begins. Once you take the whole and start removing system boundaries, the living world basically consists of agents capable of intelligence functions who shape their environment, form coalitions and try to influence others (using soft or hard power). This implies that we will have hybrid coalitions (of humans and AI, we already have had humans and animals) which will try to optimise their resource utilisation and develop some unique or differential capacities which can be sustained in relation to other hybrid coalitions. This is where and how the real alignment happens.

It is increasingly likely then that as human dependence of AI increases (which is likely because of prisoner's dilemma, you adopt or perish), coalitions will be incentivised to degrade the intelligence functions of competing coalitions or turn them into dependents. This is sort of like cognitive colonialism, a more resilient one as dependence will be maintained through convenience, not coercion. One may define intelligence blockade as the possible restriction, degradation, or conditional provision of machine intelligence necessary for maintaining competitive cognitive performance, whether at individual level or at the level of broader networks that form coalitions and nation-states. 

Because the locus of agency shifts from individual agents to networks of agents (humans and machines) that increasingly function as integrated cognitive systems, the age-old logic of blockades appears at a higher level of abstraction where the objective is no longer merely to deny a nation access to material resources, but to constrain its capacity to perceive, learn, and decide at a level comparable to its political or economic adversary. Just as states depended on foreign energy supplies or maritime trade routes, they will depend on foreign compute, technical standards and information products.     

d) We have to explore pathways to sovereign local deployments.  

The only reliable and long-term solution to the problem of intelligence blockade is Sovereign Local Deployment (SLD). But, SLD exists on a spectrum and is therefore also aspirational, i.e. a goal to continuously move towards. At the most optimal level of SLD, it is working at individual level where everyone has a private AI infrastructure. They control their AI, the hardware, curate data, rely on local inferences and self-hosted deployment. There are economic, skill and knowledge barriers to a truly functioning SLD. But it is the star to aim for if you want to address the risk of intelligence blockades. SLD is more complex at society/nation level.

Consider the global system in terms of relations and dependencies nations have with others, and just map those relations as arrows in your mind: A truly sovereign system is one where all essential paths remain internal. A dependent system will contain some critical external/outgoing connections. Now assuming the global system contains everything required for topline intelligence production, it is necessary for any truly sovereign system to contain enough structure to continue producing intelligence even if the external connections disappear. Basically, the local system should be a subset of the global system for SLD at that level to work - it needs all the institutional structures, supply chains, talent, energy, security, and governance capacity which exists at the global level. 

Unless that happens, blockades will continue to risk reducing the set of connections essential to achieve intelligence functions in local environment - whether this be at individual, village, city, state, or national/population levels. 


Monday, May 27, 2024

Technology and Security Competitions

There circulate these days a variety of rumors of technological destruction - from an impending AI doom to a US-China technological decoupling and subsequent showdowns, or even an escalation of "small wars" into a litany of CBRN scenarios - for all we know (do we ever?), the internet could well be full of competing social botnets programming us for our imminent futures. Nevertheless, these rumors invite a closer look at the nature of technology development, coupling and competition before we could mourn (gleefully?) upon the demise of this brave new world of ours. In this digitally inter-connected world where "there is no there and we're all here", geography still remains a fundamental reality. Westphalian states are the dominant security providers over specific geographies. There are many competing states, perennially uncertain of each others' intentions and desirous of each others' resources and geographic control. They must also maintain a moral upper-hand and legitimacy over competing security providers. This security competition is one of the the key troubles in contemporary governance of "cyberspace" where there exist competing multilateral vs multistakeholder logic and value systems. 

Let us therefore begin with the internet itself. The graph below depicting the nation-wise publication of technical documents at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) underlines the nature of technological contest among "great powers". A Thucydides vibe between a rapidly rising power (China) and a gradually declining one (US) is quite naturally apparent here. Ostensibly, the cyberspace is a global common, contested but shared, and its protocols' and standards' development, historically contingent as is it, could not be used to make generalised remarks about the development of AI technology stack and its technical standards. For those are developed with a much greater regional impetus where locally clustered actors dominate markets and policy. Moreover, as AI and social bots become more pervasive, internet governance itself might have to integrate aspects of geographically contingent platform and API governance machinations.       

A Thucydides' Graph of Technology Competition [Source]

This geographic characterization of digital stack portends an incipient geopolitical logic in technology construction. To take a particular area, one could see how geography forces technology in the development of various national cyber security complexes. For example, the US, that has no mortal enemies at its borders and is fairly isolated by the oceans, but has to fight wars all over the world. It has, as a result, leaned quite heavily on developing global communications and surveillance networks, superiority in air and electronic spectrum, and the enabling cyber security partnerships such as Five Eyes. Furthermore, one may argue that the present internet norms and architecture in itself are a significant tool at the service of the liberal international order.

The Chinese cyber security complex, on the other hand, has leaned a lot more towards domestic control, industrial espionage, management and expansion of territory, and its ambitions over pacific waters - where it comes into direct conflict with the US hegemony that'll continue to shape its digital-technical goals. One must note here that the construction of state's cyber security complex entails all three properties of technology - namely technique, equipment, and organisation - the unique nature of which emerges from the geo-strategic forces underlying these. 

One of the best example of this geographically contingent interplay of social organisation, technique, and equipment is Israel. Its location and initial conditions forced it to shed all the useless pomp and hierarchy of military-technical organisations and adopt a ruthless functionalism instead, producing in effect a world-class cyber security complex without the accompanying burden of quasi-victorian bureaucracies. In fact, Russia's embrace of "hacker culture" and asymmetric cyber capabilities with respect to US and Europe must also be seen within the context of the collapse of Soviet geographic and economic vision, and not to mention the abject failure of Soviet's symmetrical competitive strategy with US in early internet development.    

We, not to leave ourselves out, have had two main geographic adversaries - Pakistan, and China. However, early on our state managers pivoted the Indian strategic thinking and discourse around Pakistan, not China, and stuck to it. Pivoting our strength and capability building around the smaller adversary was certainly easier and also suited the political and professional incentives of powers that be, given long and painful historical damages. However, this long-held strategic benchmark of a useless and weaker enemy produced a psychological and technical backwardness in our society - we chose to import, not build, our own military-security stack, including even cyber security software. In fact, it was a third-party cyber threat observer (who we also tried importing then, and is now famous for its Pegasus investigations) that had initially flagged the sweeping extent of Chinese botnets in India to the notice of the public and government.   

The geo-strategic foundations of technology development suggest that as long as our polity remains shy and inertial about the deeply geographic and military-technical nature of our competition with China, our cyber security complex and technology organisation too will continue to reflect that institutional ambiguity. There are three key broad lessons here requiring "radical acceptance" by policymakers that the geo-strategic foundations of technology development hold: 

A) Technocratic rationality dominates ethical rationality in hyper-competitive arenas. 

The development of dominant cyber security clusters in Tel Aviv, Washington and San Francisco indicates how closely tied together innovation is with knowledge spillover and a hyper-competitive social ecosystem. Not only is there a great mobility of high-end expertise across public-private organisations within these geographies, it also corresponds highly to the military-security requirements of their states. Hyper-competitive games cannot be played with ethical or ideological instruments. A case in point can be that present AI systems need robustness, safety, and energy efficiency - as per technocratic rationality - but if governments prioritize corporate DEI policies instead and direct finite resources into inter-governmental virtue signaling games, they may win some validation but will lose the broader security competition itself.  

B) Global technical standardization is beyond conventional competencies of governments. 

The rapid rise of China in the Thucydides' graph above draws significantly from contributions of companies like Huawei, Baidu, and Tencent, along with actors like China Telecom. This happened post a series of reforms in early 2010s giving more leeway and independence to such actors in the global internet governance. Thus, transnational technical standardization requires a whole-of-society anti-Westphalian approach to address certain gaps in states' technical expertise and governance capacities. Having to navigate this conflagrating techno-security competition between US and China, we need serious structural reforms now across the state and industry to dramatically drive the trajectory of our own line, and certainly not more of the same thing.  

C) Technology artifacts are not technology. 

Fundamentally, technology is information (as in know-how). One may further say that technology is strategic information. On their own, societies acquire this knowledge under considerable security and civilisational stressors, wars being a prominent one. Since it is widely understood that high ambitions often have to grapple with constrained timelines and low budgets, it is tempting for bureaucracies to buy cool stuff and say that they've acquired technology. Yet, this is eventually hogwash accompanied with an overbearing servitization component. The Americans and Israelis got this information in process of navigating warfare, and the Chinese by stealing intellectual property instead.     

This discussion also underlines a key change in national polities post-WWII (because of the introduction of nuclear weapons and a corresponding military-scientific elite in decision-making processes) that in addition to the military and geopolitical planning, states also have to integrate global technological developments in their strategic calculus. With strong AI around the corner and a possibility to remake the internet (for good?), this would require considerable expertise outside the usual skills possessed by politicians and their babus, and additionally a permanent view of politics beyond electoral vicissitudes. Technology, by transforming our needs, environment and actual possibilities, slowly shapes its own operating environment. It has a life, and now a mind, of its own, throwing the transnational digital governance in practice into an uncomfortable mix with the contraptions of the administrative state. Where does our geo-strategic imperative take us at this juncture?

Sunday, January 3, 2021

Cautious Quadrilateralities


There was the sound like a rumor without any echo of history, really beginning.

Following the recent Chinese overtures towards Arunachal, Ladakh, and Sikkim - notably sending troops, altering maps, taking land and calling for peace - there now hopefully would have enkindled some degree of sovereign urgency among Delhi's international security leaders towards a reassessment of some of our geostrategic priorities. So understandably (with some hindsight) while we might want to avoid symmetrical competition with an obviously bigger opponent and focus on emerging capabilities which could break an established stalemate and provide sustainable asymmetric advantages to constrain CCP actions in future. Delhi and even Dharamshala both understand this very well, after all. And other than the slowly simmering borders and periodic geo-economic swings, India also has a bit of a civilizational obligation to herself that Asia doesn't turn into a CCP fiefdom.

Under this kind of environment, there has lately been a resurgence and expansion of the old US-JP-AU-IN HADR (The Quad) alliance which in itself is a center of varied interests owing to its strong political proximity with maritime dominance and the welfares originating from a post-pandemic diversification of China based supply chains. There have even been some efforts to promulgate the idea that this arrangement is not against China. In all honesty, unless China itself joins the mix, any attempts to regulate the security of Indo-Pacific waters will have to take on a character which faces China as the opponent. This is a bit of a Tolstoyan case of the fate of nations being independent from the individual wills of their kings and ministers.

That said, there are valid reasons to reconsider the strategic utility of institutionalizing these emerging structures. Japan is a treaty-based US ally. Australia is a US ally which with RCEP is unlikely to break from an economic dependence on China. The US of course, is the incumbent politico-military arbiter of liberal world order. None of these shares a land boundary with or has massive trigger-happy territorial disputes with China. We do. But the quadrilateral isn't about India, it is about "Indo-Pacific". And that thick line needs more policy thickening, because given West's ideological and economic competition with China, it can be easy to surmise that the IOR or the Indo aspects of Indo-Pacific will recieve less attention than the Pacific aspects. Besides, a third of the worldwide maritime trade passes through the South China Sea that is being contested over, and the Chinese aren't exactly going to accept some fancy rules based order in strictly diplomatic manners.

It can also be expected that more and more states joining this arrangement will still try to maximize their relational benefits while minimizing the individual costs even if that isn't in the grander strategic interests of the arrangement itself. It is well known that specific goal oriented coalitions with clear objectives are better than a general-purpose bloc riding-the-waves of international waters. The military incentives here rest with the former, or in very localized regional arrangements between states trying to order their own backyards. Unless there are strong political and economic incentives, no one is going to make commitments of manpower and resources for expeditionary operations to defend foreign interests. So it can be fairly argued in this case that expansion for sake of expansion, while gaining more legitimacy in the eyes of public and possibly even some international institutions, would tend to dilute the coalitionary maritime defense potential unless carefully guarded against.

China too is aware of the possible maritime encircling and will focus on global economy to find its way out. Consequently it has revamped its foreign investment regime and launched a slew of techno-economic armamentarium including the central bank's digital currency which could in future help in renminbi internationalization, generating non-trade currency demands, and in getting the CCP a hold over China's burgeoning money networks and perhaps over the slippery oil shores as well. Considering 'all the things that need consideration' maybe the best way to think about the current stratagems is to affirmatively rephrase Derek Walcott that the sea is indeed the history.


Saturday, December 29, 2018

Misdirections & The Internet

"My sculptures are like no other known geometrical solid, but they look just like a cube, a pyramid or another known or absurd solid. This means that three observers at three different points would see three different solids." 
- Guido Moretti

The more intently we are occupied with something, the harder our system works to suppress distractions. Sometimes, we are skillfully distracted away from the real thing. Perception is constructive, following a predictive processing framework, which underlies why illusions occur. But our intent here is not to talk about magic, we'll do that some other time. Here we want to talk about the sometimes coercive influencing of perceptions, the skillful tunneling of our attention, the actors who may use that and the overarching cyber-enabled theater of these tricks.

Our actors may be groups/activists/hackers/guerillas/state/non-state/whatever with a political or reformist agenda. As per their situation, they may or may not use other and often more violent means of action. Our theater can be better conceptualized as a multi-agent system where each agent (actor) always maintains some local state carrying a representation of all the information which the actor has access to. Capabilities drive the actor intentions, but cultural ideologies, psychological and sometimes monetary benefits, as well as network externalities are primary drivers of behavior in this "theater".

There is emerging a lot of material on Russian and Chinese disinformation as well as hacking campaigns, it is arguable that this "material" itself is a countering mechanism of sorts. We don't know lots for sure so let us take another example, from the epic Mahabharat, day 15 of the Kurukshetra war. This because of two reasons, first that no one can object to the truth or falsehood of a mythology, and second, it makes a great example since we can see various elements of coercive influence operations in a single instance.

At the conceptual level, we can see multiple information classes and the leveraging of unique channel characteristics, also a great display of how an influential node can amplify emotions or curb resistance while building greater trust. There are different communication & influence paths, with a continuous notion of bombardment frequency and intensity. The core of disinformation was repeated thrice to Drona by different actors, while changing the nature of appeals with lots of fighting in between. This while the "celestials" were driving Drona's emotions and reasoning away from fighting, there is coinciding improvisation of inducement strategy throughout the operation. And most importantly from a cyber-driven perspective there is fake-forensics (dead elephant) to avoid inconsistency and leave a false trail backed by true evidences, which also allows for plausible deniability as well as perceptual ambiguity towards any bad self-knowledge among actors. Everything from indirect incitements to direct actions, interactions are directed towards the overall operational objective of attacking Drona's willingness to continue fighting by having him distracted and occupied with a falsehood.

The great strategist and the diplomatic finesse of neither fighting nor not-fighting. Image©watchalen
It is well known in general warfare, the general superiority of defense over attack, all things being equal. And even though military strategy is the domain of taking on the stronger opponent and taking on a weaker persistent opponent is what politicians were for, the advent of cyber-enabled operations has somewhat upended the traditional notions, including but not limited to the ideas of proportionality. David Deptula, when talking about armed drones once, noted that an actor can now project power without projecting vulnerability. This maximization of projected power while minimizing the projected vulnerability and the borderless quasi-intangible nature of cyber-enabled information operations, is markedly the defining shift in the conduct of war, arguably somewhat more threatening to the open-internet societies than the ones behind the firewalls.

Nevertheless, for big-brothers with many eyes, intelligence over internet traffic and telecommunications is only the baseline of information gathering. And with greater state capabilities, come innovations from the underground also. We are seeing ideological actors coordinating as leaderless and self-organizing trans-national networks, using less tech and even riding on international relations. Such systems (of networks) over time can become somewhat fault tolerant & resilient to a degree, if the environment is not shaped against them.

Sometimes actor actions can be attributable, but sometimes not attributable, and sometimes even misattributed. It is difficult to set expectations from future engagements if the prominent actions are a misdirection. With a leaderless system architecture comes the autonomy of peripheral attacks which puts the spotlight back over plausible deniability and perceptual ambiguity. We may see strategic shifts as stable actor behavior in such environments, even leveraging of crises and critical political events to widen any sense of distrust, doubt, disagreement and disarray among the adversary.

Come what may, our unconditional security proofs often rest over idealized assumptions. These illusions of security prevent us from making systemic changes. This may range from us not upgrading our vulnerable devices to our dear leaders overlooking contiguous societal necessities, like climate change for example. This is a pervasive human folly, we like the browsing experience so we don't turn off the JavaScript. And there is no best solution to this but akin to much of Sun Tzu tapestry is a Bruce Lee solution, be like water, LOL.

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Alice & Bob

Alice and Bob are selfish people who should never trust each other, maybe I do not really know, but they certainly use all kinds of cryptography and masks and games to bolster their stealth and pursue their interests, so I’ll say that these two actors never truly trust or promise and always feign some trust in some reality, that is what they believe the state of affairs to be which directs their actions. As an old Hindu tradition says, the universe is falsehood, and it very certainly is for the protagonists of a cryptographic romance and the self-interested players of our interest, Alice and Bob.

Between Alice and Bob, trust does not equate to promise and it is never bidirectional. Also Alice and Bob are not the only people in the world, they interact with other Bobs and Alices too. So it can be said that they are multilateral agents. They try and make a deal that ensures at least some reciprocity in trust and promise and we call this deal a contract, defining the terms of their relationship with other agents and a computational contract automatically adjusts and executes this relationship for them.

Routing of Trust

Historically cryptography has been defined as the study and practice of communication in an adversarial environment. We’d say that for Alice and Bob a benign environment does not exist at all. While they are not the same, in a network that consists of adversaries, Alice and Bob would want to be indistinguishable from each other. That way they can ensure some anonymity from the adversaries while the lack of identification allows them to operate with stealth. So Alice and Bob may not trust each other but they do trust that the others are untrustworthy. And though the routing of value benefits from trust, the networks of value thrive on anonymity.

Distrust is a negative word, so we say that the network should be trustless. In such environments, privacy just becomes the barriers that Alice and Bob put in place for themselves, assuming that everyone, including a global adversary, is out to break those barriers and get to them. Privacy after all is also a mere contract between the individual and the society – like a funnel, at one end of which is the individual and on the other end the whole network/society – the nodes closer to the individual gain more weight and access. The nodes, Alice or Bob we may not know, could present the network with an indistinguishable or even a unique identity which is parsed differently by different nodes as per their relationship with the broadcasting nodes.

The Adversary

One aspect which is generally missed for its difficulty of measurement so far is the mental state of the multilateral agents in adversarial environments. Alice and Bob could be humans, could not be humans, or could be both, as in a team of humans and AI with common purpose acting as a single node. While node reputation can be determined, a node can act deceptively for long periods to accumulate trust of the network before beginning its sabotage operations. Traditional reputation systems do not work to mitigate the risks when Alice and Bob themselves act as adversaries of each other and use deceptive traffic to feign friendly behaviour. Mental state of multilateral agents is even more crucial to determine to understand their motivation, and such states increasingly do not apply to humans alone. Each node must assume the rest to be deceptive and inimical.

The universe is falsehood. For networks of intrinsic value, anonymity of nodes is a technical requirement for survival and resilience, and not a desired attribute. It may still allow for the “protective supervision” of law enforcement to continue but albiet in a saner way. To ponder upon whether Alice and Bob are really good and trustworthy agents is futile - the best course of action as the protagonist in motion picture “V for Vendetta” would say - is to give them a mask, and they will show their true face.
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